Measuring uncertainty is a promising technique for detecting adversarial examples, crafted inputs on which the model predicts an incorrect class with high confidence. But many measures of uncertainty exist, including predictive entropy and mutual information, each capturing different types of uncertainty. We study these measures, and shed light on why mutual information seems to be effective at the task of adversarial example detection. We highlight failure modes for MC dropout, a widely used approach for estimating uncertainty in deep models. This leads to an improved understanding of the drawbacks of current methods, and a proposal to improve the quality of uncertainty estimates using probabilistic model ensembles. We give illustrative experiments using MNIST to demonstrate the intuition underlying the different measures of uncertainty, as well as experiments on a realworld Kaggle dogs vs cats classification dataset.
Introduction
Deep neural networks are state of the art models for representing complex, high dimensional data such as natural images. However, neural networks are not robust: it is possible to find small perturbations to the input of the network that produce erroneous and over-confident classification results. Such perturbed inputs, known as adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013) , are a major hurdle for the use of deep networks in safety-critical applications, or those for which security is a concern.
One possible hypothesis for the existence of adversarial examples is that such images lie off the manifold of natural images, occupying regions where the model makes unconstrained extrapolations. If this hypothesis were to hold true, then one would be able to detect adversarial perturbation by measuring the distance of the perturbed input to the image manifold.
Hypothetically, such distances could be measured using nearest neighbour approaches, or by assessing the probability of the input under a density model on image space. However, approaches based on geometric distance are a poor choice for images, as pixel-wise distance is a poor metric for perceptual similarity; similarly, density modelling is difficult to scale to the very high dimensional spaces found in image recognition.
Instead, we may consider proxies to the distance from the image manifold. For example, the model uncertainty of a discriminative Bayesian classification model will be high Figure 1 : Uncertainty of a standard dropout network trained on MNIST, as measured by mutual information, visualized in the latent space obtained from a variational autoencoder. Colours are classes for each encoded training image. In white is uncertainty, calculated by decoding each latent point into image space, and evaluating the mutual information between the decoded image and the model parameters. A lighter background corresponds to higher uncertainty.
for points far away from the training data, in theory. High capacity Bayesian neural networks, for example, could then be used to obtain such measures of uncertainty. Under the hypothesis that adversarial examples lie far from the image manifold, i.e. the training data, such uncertainty could be used to identify an input as adversarial.
The uncertainty of such models is not straightforward to obtain. Numerical methods for integrating the posterior, such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo, are difficult to scale to large datasets (Gal, 2016) . As a result, approximations have been studied extensively. For example, approximate inference in Bayesian neural networks using dropout is a computationally tractable technique (Gal & Ghahramani, 2016) which has been successfully used in the literature (Leibig et al., 2017; Gal, 2016) . Further, it has been shown that dropout based model uncertainty can form a good proxy for the detection of adversarial examples (Li & Gal, 2017; Feinman et al., 2017; Rawat et al., 2017) .
However, existing research has mostly overlooked the effect of the chosen measure for uncertainty quantification. Many such measures exist, including mutual information, predictive entropy, softmax variance, expected entropy, and the entropy of deterministic deep networks. (Li & Gal, 2017) for example use expected entropy, (Rawat et al., 2017) use mutual information, whereas (Feinman et al., 2017) estimate the variance of multiple draws from the predictive distribution (obtained using dropout). Further, to date, research for the identification of adversarial examples using model uncertainty has concentrated on toy problems such as MNIST, and has not been shown to extend to more realistic data distributions and larger models such as ResNet (He et al., 2015) .
In this paper we examine the differences between the various measures of uncertainty used for adversarial example detection, and in the process provide further evidence for the hypothesis that model uncertainty could be used to identify an input as adversarial. More specifically, we illustrate the differences between the measures by projecting the uncertainty onto lower dimensional spaces (see for example Fig. 1 ). We show that the softmax variance can be seen as an approximation to the mutual information (section 3.2), explaining the effectiveness of this rather ad-hoc technique. We show that non-adversarial off-manifold images (for example image interpolations) are treated in the same way as adversarial inputs by some measures of uncertainty (inputs which were not assessed in previous literature using such measures). We highlight ways in which dropout fails to capture the full Bayesian uncertainty by visualizing gaps in model uncertainty in the latent space (Section 4.2), and use this insight to propose a simple extension to dropout schemes to be studied in future research. We finish by demonstrating the effectiveness of dropout on the real-world ASIRRA (Elson et al., 2007) cats and dogs classification dataset (Section 4.3). Code for the experiments described in this paper is available online 1 .
Background
We begin with a brief review of required literature on Bayesian neural networks and adversarial examples.
Bayesian Deep Learning
A deep neural network (with a given architecture) defines a function f : X → Y parametrised by a set of weights and biases
. These parameters are generally chosen to minimize some energy function E : Y × Y → R on the model outputs and the target outputs over some dataset
with x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. Since neural networks are highly flexible models with many degrees of freedom, modifications to this loss to regularize the solution are often necessary, so that the weights are chosen aŝ
for the common choice of an L 2 regulariser with weight decay λ.
Rather than thinking of the weights as fixed parameters to be optimized over, the Bayesian approach is to treat them as random variables, and so we place a prior distribution p(ω) over the weights of the network. If we also have a likelihood function p(y | x, ω) that gives the probability of y ∈ Y given a set of parameter values and an input to the network, we can then conduct inference given a dataset by marginalizing the parameters. Such models are known as Bayesian neural networks.
If, as is often the case, the prior on the weights is a zero mean Gaussian with diagonal covariance, and the energy of the network is the negative log likelihood (so p(y | ω, x) = e −E(f (x),y) ) then the optimized solution in equation 1 corresponds to a mode of the posterior over the weights.
Ideally we would integrate out our uncertainty by taking the expectation of the predictions over the posterior, rather than using this point estimate. For neural networks this can only be done approximately. Here we discuss one practical approximation, variational inference with dropout approximating distributions.
Variational Inference and Dropout
Variational inference is a general technique for approximating complex probability distributions. The idea is to approximate the intractable posterior p(ω | D) with a simpler approximating distribution q θ (ω). By applying Jensen's inequality to the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the approximating distribution and the true posterior, we can obtain the log-evidence lower bound L V I
Since the model evidence is a constant that does not depend on the parameters of q θ , maximizing L V I with respect to θ will minimize the KL divergence between q and the model posterior. The key advantage of this from a computational point of view is that we have replaced an integration problem with the optimization problem of maximising a parametrised function, which can be approached by standard gradient based techniques.
For neural networks, a common approximating distribution is dropout (Srivastava et al., 2014 ) and it's variants. In the variational framework, this means the weights are drawn from
for a network with L layers, where the dimension of each layer is K i × K i−1 , and the parameters of q are
Informally, this corresponds to randomly setting the outputs of units in the network to zero (or zeroing the rows of the fixed matrix M l ). Often the layer dropout probabilities p i are chosen as constant and not varied as part of the variational framework, but it is possible to learn these parameters as well . Using variational inference, the expectation over the posterior can be evaluated by replacing the true posterior with the approximating distribution. The dropout distribution is still challenging to marginalize, but it is readily sampled from, so expectations can be approximated using the Monte Carlo estimator
Adversarial Examples
Works by (Szegedy et al., 2013) and others, demonstrating that state-of-the-art deep image classifiers can be fooled by small perturbations to input images, have initiated a great deal of interest in both understanding the reasons for why such adversarial examples occur with deep models, as well as devising methods to resist and detect adversarial attacks. So far, attacking has proven more successful than defence; a recent survey of defences by (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) found that, with the partial exception of the method based on dropout uncertainty analysed by (Feinman et al., 2017) , all other investigated defence methods failed.
There is no precise definition of when an example qualifies as 'adversarial'. The most common definition used is of an input x adv which is close to a real data point x as measured by some L p norm, but is classified wrongly by the network with high score. Speaking more loosely, an adversarially perturbed input is one which a human observer would assign a certain class, but for which the network would predict a different class with a high score.
It is notable that there exists a second, related, type of images which have troubling implications for the robustness of deep models, namely meaningless images which are nevertheless classified confidently as belonging to a particular class (see, for example, (Nguyen et al., 2015) ). These are often produced more for the visualization of network features than in the interests of producing an adversarial attack, yet they are still an interesting shortcoming of neural networks from the point of view of uncertainty, since they are points that are far from all training data by any reasonable metric (based on either pixel-wise or perceptual distance), yet the model gives confident (low predictive entropy) predictions for. We refer to these as 'rubbish class examples' or 'fooling images' following (Nguyen et al., 2015) and (Goodfellow et al., 2014) .
Several possible explanations for the existence of adversarial examples have been proposed in the literature (Akhtar & Mian, 2018) . These include the idea, proposed in the original paper by (Szegedy et al., 2013) , that the set of adversarial examples are a dense, low probability set like the rational numbers on R, with the discontinuous boundary somehow due to the strong non-linearity of neural networks. Contrary to that, (Goodfellow et al., 2014) proposed that adversarial examples are partially due of the intrinsically linear response of neural network layers to their inputs. (Tanay & Griffin, 2016) have proposed that adversarial examples are possible when the decision boundaries are strongly tilted with respect to the vector separating the means of the class clusters.
Many of these ideas are consistent with the idea that the training data of the model lies on a low dimensional manifold in image space, the hypothesis we build upon and provide evidence for in this paper.
Measures of Uncertainty
There are two major sources of uncertainty a model may have:
1. epistemic uncertainty is uncertainty due to our lack of knowledge; we are uncertain because we lack understanding. In terms of machine learning, this corresponds to a situation where our model parameters are poorly determined due to a lack of data, so our posterior over parameters is broad.
2. aleatoric uncertainty is due to genuine stochasticity in the data. In this situation, an uncertain prediction is the best possible prediction. This corresponds to noisy data; no matter how much data the model has seen, if there is inherent noise then the best prediction possible may be a high entropy one (for example, if we train a model to predict coin flips, the best prediction is the max-entropy distribution P (heads) = P (tails)).
In the classification setting, where the output of a model is a conditional probability distribution P (y|x) over some discrete set of outcomes Y, one straight-forward measure of uncertainty is the entropy of the predictive distribution
However, the predictive entropy is not an entirely satisfactory measure of uncertainty, since it does not distinguish between epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties. However, it may be of interest to do so; in particular, we want to capture when an input lies in a region of data space where the model is poorly constrained, and distinguish this from inputs near the data distribution with noisy labels.
An attractive measure of uncertainty able to distinguish epistemic from aleatoric examples is the information gain between the model parameters and the data. Recall that the mutual information (MI) between two random variables X and Y is given by
. The amount of information we would gain about the model parameters if we were to receive a label y for a new point x, given the dataset D is then given by
Being uncertain about an input point x implies that if we knew the label at that point we would gain information. Conversely, if the parameters at a point are already well determined, then we would gain little information from obtaining the label. Thus, the MI is a measurement of the model's epistemic uncertainty.
In the form presented above, it is also readily approximated using the Bayesian interpretation of dropout. The first term we will refer to as the 'predictive entropy'; this is just the entropy of the predictive distribution, which we have already discussed. The second term is the mean of the entropy of the predictions given the parameters over the posterior distribution p(ω | D), and we thus refer to it as the expected entropy.
These quantities are not tractable analytically for deep nets, but using the dropout approximation and equation (2), the predictive distribution, entropy and the MI are readily computable (Gal, 2016) :
where
Other, more ad-hoc, measures of uncertainty include the variance of the softmax probabilities p(y = c | ω i , x) (with the variance calculated over i), and variation ratios (Gal, 2016) , with the former commonly used in previous research.
In the next section we shed light on the properties of these measures of uncertainty in the context of adversarial example detection. We relate the more ad-hoc softmax variance measure to the principled mutual information, and give intuition into why some measures are more suitable for adversarial example detection than others. This is followed by empirical evaluation of these ideas.
Understanding Measures of Uncertainty for Adversarial Example Detection
We start by explaining the type of uncertainty relevant for adversarial example detection under the hypothesis that adversarial images lie off the manifold of natural images, occupying regions where the model makes unconstrained extrapolations. We continue by relating the fairly adhoc softmax variance measure of uncertainty to mutual information.
Adversarial Examples and Uncertainty
Both the MI and predictive entropy should increase on inputs which lie far from the image manifold. Under our hypothesis, we expect both to be effective in highlighting such inputs. However, predictive entropy could also be high near the image manifold, on inputs which have inherent ambiguity. Such inputs could be ambiguous images (for example, with MNIST, an image that could be either of class 1 or 7), or more generally interpolations between classes. Such inputs would have high predictive probability for more than one class, yielding high predictive entropy (but low MI). Such inputs are clearly not adversarial, but will falsely trigger an automatic detection system 2 . We demonstrate this experimentally in the next section.
Further, adversarial example crafting algorithms seek to create an example image with a different class to the original, typically by either minimising the predicted probability of the current class for an untargeted attack, or maximising the predicted probability of a target class. This has the side-effect that adversarial examples seek to minimise the entropy of the predictions, a simple consequence of the normalisation of the probability. It is interesting to highlight that this also affects the uncertainty as measured by MI; since both the mutual information and entropy are strictly positive, the mutual information is bounded above by the predictive entropy (see equation 4) . Therefore, the model giving low entropy predictions at a point is a sufficient condition for the mutual information to be low as well. Equally, the mutual information bounds the entropy from below; it is not possible for a model to give low entropy predictions when the MI is high.
Mutual Information and Softmax Variance
Some works in the literature estimate the epistemic uncertainty of a dropout model using the estimated variance of the MC samples, rather than the mutual information (Leibig et al., 2017; Feinman et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) . This is somewhat ad-hoc, but seems to work fairly well in practice. We suggest a possible explanation to the effectiveness of this ad-hoc measure, arguing that the softmax variance can be seen as a proxy to the mutual information.
One way to see the relation between the two measures of uncertainty is to observe that the variance is the leading term in the series expansion of the mutual information which we demonstrate below. For brevity, we denote the sampled distributions p(y | ω i , x) as p i and the mean predictive distribution p M C (y | x) asp. These are in general distribution over C classes, and we denote the probability of the j th class asp j and p ij for the mean and i th sampled distribution respectively. The variance score is the mean variance across the classeŝ
We speculate that previous research using predictive entropy has not encountered this phenomenon due to insufficient coverage of the test cases.
And the mutual information score iŝ
Using a Taylor expansion of the logarithm,
we see that the first term in the series is identical up to a multiplicative constant to the mean variance of the samples.
This relation between the softmax variance and the mutual information measure could explain the effectiveness of the variance in detecting adversarial examples encountered by (Feinman et al., 2017) . MI increases on images far from the image manifold and not on image interpolations (on which the predictive variance increases as well), with the variance following similar trends.
We next give an empirical study of these various measures of uncertainty, and demonstrate experimentally the claims above.
Empirical Evaluation
In the next section we demonstrate the effectiveness of various measures of uncertainty as proxies to distance from the image manifold. We demonstrate the difference in behaviour between the predictive entropy and mutual information on image interpolations, both for interpolations in the latent space as well as interpolations in image space. We continue by visualising the various measures of uncertainty, highlighting the differences discussed above. This is further developed by highlighting shortcomings with current approaches for uncertainty estimation, to which we suggest initial ideas on how to overcome and suggest new ideas for attacks (to be explored further in future research). We finish by assessing the ideas discussed in this paper on a real world dataset of cats vs dogs image classification.
Measures of Uncertainty on Image Interpolations
We start by assessing the behaviour of the measures of uncertainty on image interpolations, with interpolations Figure 2 : Entropy (middle) and the MI (bottom) vary along a convex interpolation between two images in latent space and image space (top). The entropy is high for regions along both interpolations, wherever the class of the image is ambiguous. In contrast, the MI is roughly constant along the interpolation in latent space, since these images have aleatoric uncertainty (they are ambiguous), but the model has seen data that resembles them. On the other hand, the MI has a clear peak as the pixel space interpolation produces out-of-sample images between the classes done both in latent space, as well as we in image space. Figures 2 and 3 , both showing experiments comparing interpolations, which goes off the manifold of natural images, to those in the latent space of an auto-encoder, which we assume does a reasonably good job of capturing the manifold. We see that the MI distinguishes between these on-manifold and offmanifold images, whereas the entropy fails to do so. This is necessary for the hypothesis proposed in the introduction; if we are able to accurately capture the MI, it would serve well as a proxy for whether an images belongs to the learned manifold or not.
That model uncertainty can capture what we want in practice is demonstrated in

Visualization in Latent Space and Dropout Failures
We wish to gain intuition into how the different measures of uncertainty behaves. In order to do so, we use a variational autoencoder (Kingma & Welling, 2013) to compress the MNIST latent space. By choosing a latent space of two dimensions, we can plot the encodings of the dataset in two dimensions. By decoding the image that corresponds to a point in latent space, we can classify the decoded image and evaluate the network uncertainty, thus providing a two dimensional map of the input space. Figure 1 shows the latent space with the MI measure of uncertainty, calculated using dropout. Similarly, Figure  4 shows the predictive entropy measure of uncertainty. Note the differences in uncertainty near the class clusters boundaries (corresponding to image interpolations) -the MI has low uncertainty in these regions, whereas the figure 1 . Note the differences with the MI, which is low everywhere close to the data in the centre of the plot, but the entropy is high between the classes here. These points correspond to images which resemble digits, but which are inherently ambiguous. Note however that there are large regions of latent space where the predictive entropy is high and the MI low, despite being far from any training data. predictive entropy is high.
Another question of interest in this context is how well the dropout approximation captures uncertainty. The approximating distribution is fairly crude, and variational inference schemes are known to underestimate the uncertainty of the posterior, tending to fit an approximation to a local mode rather than capturing the full posterior 3 .
Figure 5: A typical garbage class example generated by searching latent space. This is classified as a 2 with high confidence.
As seen from the figures, the network does a reasonable job of capturing uncertainty close to the data. However, the network's uncertainty has 'holes'-regions where the predictions of the model are very confident, despite the images generated by the decoder here being essentially nonsense (see Figure 5 ). This is somewhat troubling; we want our models to be uncertain on data that does not resemble what they saw during training. It also suggests that, while the uncertainty estimates generated by MC dropout are useful, they do not capture the full posterior, instead capturing local behaviour near one of it's modes.
This may offer an explanation as to why MC dropout nets are still vulnerable to adversarial attack; since they do not capture the full posterior, there are still regions where they approximating distribution q may not have sufficient capacity to represent the full posterior, and secondly, the asymmetry of the KL divergence, which penalizes q placing probability mass where the support of p is small far more heavily than the reverse.
Figure 6: The MI calculated using an ensemble of dropout models, treating all of their predictions as Monte Carlo samples from the posterior. This mitigates some of the spuriously confident regions in latent space are mistakenly overconfident, which adversarial attack algorithms can exploit. This intuition suggests a simple fix; since a single dropout model averages over a single mode of the posterior, we can capture the posterior using an ensemble of dropout models using different initializations, assuming that these will converge to different local modes. We find that even a small ensemble can qualitatively improve this behaviour ( Figure 6 ). We leave further developments of these insights, into both new adversarial example crafting techniques using uncertainty gaps, as well as into new mitigation techniques using ensembles, for future research.
Lastly, it should be noted that there is no guarantee that an ensemble of dropout models captures the true posterior. It will approximate it well only if the true posterior is concentrated in many local modes, all of roughly equal likelihood (since all the models in the ensemble are weighted equally), and a randomly initialized variational dropout net trained with some variant of gradient descent will converge to all of these modes with roughly equal probability.
Evaluation on Cats and Dogs Dataset
It has been observed by (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a ) that many proposed defences against adversarial examples fail to generalize from MNIST. Therefore, we also evaluate the various uncertainty measures on a more realistic dataset; the ASSIRA cats and dogs dataset (see Figure  7 for example images). The task is to distinguish pictures of cats and dogs. While this is not a state of the art problem, these are realistic, high resolution images. We finetune a ResNet model (He et al., 2015) , pre-trained on Imagenet, replacing the final layer with a dropout layer followed by a new fully connected layer. We use 20 forward passes for the Monte Carlo dropout estimates. We use dropout only on the layers we retrain, treating the pre-trained convolutions as deterministic.
We compare the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of the predictive entropy of the deterministic network, the predictive entropy of the dropout network (equation 7), and the MI of the dropout network (the MI is always zero if the model is deterministic; this corresponds to the approximating distribution q being a delta function). Note that we compare with the same set of weights (trained with dropout) -the only difference is whether we use dropout at test time. For each measure of uncertainty we generate the ROC plot by thresholding the uncertainty at different values, using the threshold to decide whether an input is adversarial or not.
The receiver operating characteristic is evaluated on a synthetic dataset consisting of images drawn at random from the test set and images from the test set corrupted by Gaussian noise, which comprise the negative examples, as well as adversarial examples generated with the Basic Iterative Method (Kurakin et al., 2016) , Fast Gradient method (Goodfellow et al., 2014) , and Momentum Iterative Method (Dong et al., 2017) . We test with the final attack because it is notably strong, winning the recent NIPS adversarial attack competition, and is simpler to adapt to stochastic models than the other strong attacks in the literature, such as that of Carlini and Wagner (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) .
We find that only the mutual information gets a useful AUC on adversarial examples. In fact, most other measures of uncertainty seem to be worse than random guessing; this suggests that this dataset has a lot of examples the model considers to be ambiguous (high aleatoric uncertainty), which mean that the entropy has a high false positive rate. The fact the AUC of the entropy is low suggests that the model is actually more confident about adversarial examples than natural ones under this measure.
An interesting quirk of this particular model is that the accuracy of using Monte Carlo estimation is actually lower than the point estimates, even though the uncertainty estimates are sensible. Possibly this is because the dropout probability is quite high; only a subset of the features We suspect that the low FGM attack success rate is related to the difficultly we observe in identifying these using model uncertainty, however further investigation is required.
in the later layers of a convnet are relevant to cat and dog discrimination, so this may be a relic of our transfer learning procedure; dropout does not normally have an adverse effect on the accuracy of fully trained models.
Discussion & Conclusion
While security considerations for practical applications are clearly a concern, fundamentally, we are interested in the question of whether adversarial examples are an intrinsic property of neural networks, in the sense that they are somehow a property of the function class, or whether they are an artefact of our training procedure, that can be addressed through better training and inference. We believe that the results in this paper are evidence in favour of the latter; even approximate marginalization produces an improvement in terms of robustness to adversarial examples. It is notable that fundamentally, these techniques can be derived without any explicit reference to the adversarial setting, and no assumptions are made about the distribution of adversarial examples. Rather, looking for better uncertainty results in better robustness automatically.
We do not claim that dropout alone provides a very convincing defence against adversarial attack. Our results (in agreement with previous literature on the subject) show that dropout networks are more difficult to attack than their deterministic counterparts, but attacks against them can still succeed while remaining imperceptible to the human eye, at least in the white-box setting we investigated.
However, we think that this is likely to be because dropout is a fairly crude approximation that underestimates the uncertainty significantly, as suggested by our visualisations in latent space. These insights suggest that the best way to combat adversarial examples is from first principles; by improving model robustness and dealing with uncertainty properly, models become harder to fool as a side effect. Looking for scalable ways to improve on the uncertainty quality captured by dropout is an important avenue for future research in this area.
